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#### Michigan MM should lose because of their usage of ableist rhetoric.

#### Gray highlighting shows the violation.

1AC Bostrom 19 - philosopher at Oxford and founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute (Nick, <https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/vulnerable.pdf>, EM)

Achieving stabilization The truth of VWH would be bad news. But it would not imply that civilization will be devastated. In principle at least, there are several responses that could stabilize the world even if vulnerability exists. Recall that we defined the hypothesis in terms of a black-ball technology making civilizational devastation extremely likely conditional on technological development continuing and the semi-anarchic default condition persisting. Thus we can theoretically consider the following possibilities for achieving stabilization: 1. Restrict technological development. 2. Ensure that there does not exist a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. 3. Establish extremely effective preventive policing. 4. Establish effective global governance. We will discuss (3) and (4) in subsequent sections. Here we consider (1) and (2). We will argue they hold only limited promise as ways of protecting against potential civilizational vulnerabilities. Technological relinquishment In its general form, technological relinquishment looks exceedingly unpromising. Recall that we construed the word ‘technology’ broadly; so that completely stopping technological development would require something close to a cessation of inventive activity everywhere in the world. That is hardly realistic; and if it could be done, it would be extremely costly – to the point of constituting an existential catastrophe in its own right (Namely, ‘permanent stagnation’ (Bostrom, 2013)). That general relinquishment of scientific and technological research is a non-starter does not, however, imply that limited curtailments of inventive activities could not be a good idea. It can make sense to forego particularly perilous directions of advancement. For instance, recalling our ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it would be sensible to discourage research into laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment (Kemp, 2012). Any technology that makes it possible to produce weapons-grade fissile material using less energy or with a smaller industrial footprint would erode important barriers to proliferation. It is hard to see how a slight reduction in the price of nuclear energy would compensate. On the contrary, the world would probably be better off if it somehow became harder and more expensive to enrich uranium. What we would ideally want in this area is not technological progress but technological regress. While targeted regress might not be in the cards, we could aim to slow the rate of advancement towards risk-increasing technologies relative to the rate of advancement in protective technologies. This is the idea expressed by the principle of differential technological development. In its original formulation, the principle focuses on existential risk; but we can apply it more broadly to also encompass technologies with ‘merely’ devastational potential: Principle of Differential Technological Development. Retard the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies (Bostrom, 2002). The principle of differential technological development is compatible with plausible forms of technological determinism. For example, even if it were ordained that all technologies that can be developed will be developed, it can still matter when they are developed. The order in which they arrive can make an important difference – ideally, protective technologies should come before the destructive technologies against which they protect; or, if that is not possible, then it is desirable that the gap be minimized so that other countermeasures (or luck) may tide us over until robust protection become available. The timing of an invention also influences what sociopolitical context the technology is born into. For example, if we believe that there is a secular trend toward civilization becoming more capable of handling black balls, then we may want to delay the most risky technological developments, or at least abstain from accelerating them. Even if we suppose that civilizational devastation is unavoidable, many would prefer it to take place further into the future, at a time when maybe they and their loved ones are no longer alive anyway.32 Differential technological development doesn’t really make sense in the original urn-of-creativity model, where the color of each ball comes as a complete surprise. If we want to use the urn model in this context, we must modify it. We could stipulate, for example, that the balls have different textures and that there is a correlation between texture and color, so that we get clues about the color of a ball before we extract it. Another way to make the metaphor more realistic is to imagine that there are strings or elastic bands between some of the balls, so that when we pull on one of them we drag along several others to which it is linked. Presumably the urn is highly tubular, since certain technologies must emerge before others can be reached (we are not likely to find a society that uses jet planes and flint axes). The metaphor would also become more realistic if we imagine that there is not just one hand daintily exploring the urn: instead, picture a throng of scuffling prospectors reaching in their arms in hopes of gold and glory, and citations. Correctly implementing differential technological development is clearly a difficult strategic task (Cf. Collingridge, 1980). Nevertheless, for an actor who cares altruistically about long-term outcomes and who is involved in some inventive enterprise (e.g. as a researcher, funder, entrepreneur, regulator, or legislator) it is worth making the attempt. Some implications, at any rate, seem fairly obvious: for instance, don’t work on laser isotope separation, don’t work on bioweapons, and don’t develop forms of geoengineering that would empower random individuals to unilaterally make drastic alterations to the Earth’s climate. Think twice before accelerating enabling technologies – such as DNA synthesis machines – that would directly facilitate such ominous developments.33 But boost technologies that are predominantly protective; for instance, ones that enable more efficient monitoring of disease outbreaks or that make it easier to detect covert WMD programs. Even if it is the case that all possible ‘bad’ technologies are bound to be developed eventually, it can still be helpful to buy a little time.34 However, differential technological development does not on its own offer a solution for vulnerabilities that persist over long periods – ones where adequately protective technologies are much harder to develop than their destructive counterparts, or where destruction has the advantage even at technological maturity.35 Preference modification Another theoretically possible way of achieving civilizational stabilization would be to change the fact that there exists a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. We reserve for later discussion of interventions that would reduce the effective number of independent actors by increasing various forms of coordination. Here we consider the possibility of modifying the distribution of preferences (within a more or less constant population of actors). The degree to which this approach holds promise depends on which type of vulnerability we have in mind. In the case of a Type-1 vulnerability, preference modification does not look promising, at least in the absence of extremely effective means for doing so. Consider that some Type-1 vulnerabilities would result in civilizational devastation if there is even a single empowered person anywhere in the world who is motivated to pursue the destructive outcome. With that kind of vulnerability, reducing the number of people in the apocalyptic residual would do nothing to forestall devastation unless the number could be reduced all the way to zero, which may be completely infeasible. It is true that there are other possible Type-1 vulnerabilities that would require a somewhat larger apocalyptic residual in order for civilizational devastation to occur: for example, in a scenario like ‘easy nukes’, maybe there would have to be somebody from the apocalyptic residual in each of several hundred cities. But this is still a very low bar. It is difficult to imagine an intervention – short of radically re-engineering human nature on a fully global scale – that would sufficiently deplete the apocalyptic residual to entirely eliminate or even greatly reduce the threat of Type-1 vulnerabilities. Note that an intervention that halves the size of the apocalyptic residual would not (at least not through any firstorder effect) reduce the expected risk from Type-1 vulnerabilities by anywhere near as much. A reduction of 5 percent or 10 percent of Type-1 risk from halving the apocalyptic residual would be more plausible. The reason is that there is wide uncertainty about how destructive some new blackball technology would be, and we should arguably use a fairly uniform prior in log space (over several orders of magnitude) over the size of apocalyptic residual that would be required in order for civilizational devastation to occur conditional on a Type-1 vulnerability arising. In other words, conditional on some new technology being developed that makes it easy for an average individual to kill at least one million people, it may be (roughly) as likely that the technology would enable the average individual to kill one million people, ten million people, a hundred million people, a billion people, or every human alive. These considerations notwithstanding, preference modification could be helpful in scenarios in which the set of empowered actors is initially limited to some small definable subpopulation. Some black-ball technologies, when they first emerge from the urn, might be difficult to use and require specialized equipment. There could be a period of several years before such a technology has been perfected to the point where an average individual could master it. During this early period, the set of empowered actors could be quite limited; for example, it might consist exclusively of individuals with bioscience expertise working in a particular type of lab. Closer screening of applicants to positions in such labs could then make a meaningful dent in the risk that a destructive individual gains access to the biotech black ball within the first few years of its emergence.36 And that reprieve may offer an opportunity to introduce other countermeasures to provide more lasting stabilization, in anticipation of the time when the technology gets easy enough to use that it diffuses to a wider population. For Type-2a vulnerabilities, the set of empowered actors is much smaller. Typically what we are dealing with here are states, perhaps alongside a few especially powerful nonstate actors. In some Type-2a scenarios, the set might consist exclusively of two superpowers, or a handful of states with special capabilities (as is currently the case with nuclear weapons). It could thus be very helpful if the preferences of even a few powerful states were shifted in a more peaceloving direction. The ‘safe first strike’ scenario would be a lot less alarming if the actors facing the security dilemma had attitudes towards one another similar to those prevailing between Finland and Sweden. For many plausible sets of incentives that could arise for powerful actors as a consequence of some technological breakthrough, the prospects for a non-devastational outcome would be significantly brightened if the actors in question had more irenic dispositions. Although this seems difficult to achieve, it is not as difficult as persuading almost all the members in the apocalyptic residual to alter their dispositions. Lastly, consider Type-2b. Recall that such a vulnerability entails that ‘by default’ a great many actors face incentives to take some damaging action, such that the combined effects add up to civilizational devastation. The incentives for using the black-ball technology must therefore be ones that have a grip on a substantial fraction of the world population – economic gain being perhaps the prime example of such a near-universal motivation. So imagine some private action, available to almost every individual, which saves each person who takes it a fraction X of his or her annual income, while producing a negative externality such that if half the world’s population takes the action then civilization gets devastated. At X = 0, we can assume that few people would take the antisocial action. But the greater X is, the larger the fraction of the population that would succumb to temptation. Unfortunately, it is plausible that the value of X that would induce at least half of the population to take the action is small, perhaps less than 1 per cent.37 While it would be desirable to change the distribution of global preferences so as to make people more altruistic and raise the value of X, this seems difficult to achieve. (Consider the many strong forces already competing for hearts and minds – corporate advertisers, religious organizations, social movements, education systems, and so on.) Even a dramatic increase in the amount of altruism in the world – corresponding, let us say, to a doubling of X from 1 percent to 2 per cent – would prevent calamity only in a relatively narrow band of scenarios, namely those in which the private benefit of using the destructive technology is in the 1–2 per cent range. Scenarios in which the private gain exceeds 2 per cent would still result in civilizational devastation. In sum, modifying the distribution of preferences within the set of actors that would be destructively empowered by a black-ball discovery could be a useful adjunct to other means of stabilization, but it can be difficult to implement and would at best offer only very partial protection (unless we assume extreme forms of worldwide re-engineering of human nature).38 Some specific countermeasures and their limitations Beside influencing the direction of scientific and technological progress, or altering destruction-related preferences, there are a variety of other possible countermeasures that could mitigate a civilizational vulnerability. For example, one could try to: • prevent the dangerous information from spreading; • restrict access to requisite materials, instruments, and infrastructure; • deter potential evildoers by increasing the chance of their getting caught; • be more cautious and do more risk assessment work; and • establish some kind of surveillance and enforcement mechanism that would make it possible to interdict attempts to carry out a destructive act.

#### 2.

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We have seen that the crisis is intensifying competition between the major imperialist and capitalist powers. The counter-tendencies have failed to prevent the onset of the next crisis. An even greater devaluation of capital and labour power is required. The death and destruction wrought by war is the ultimate source of devaluation and therefore the most important counter-tendency. If war wasn’t an inevitability under capitalism, militarism would be done away with since it is funded through taxation that could otherwise be put towards productive capital. Many Marxists have failed to grasp this. Luxemburg, for example, claimed that “from the purely economic point of view, militarism is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus-value; it is in itself a sphere of accumulation”.[496] Again, her analysis was based on circulation, not production. Grossman counters that “this is how things may appear from the standpoint of individual capital as military supplies have always been the occasion for rapid enrichment. But from the standpoint of the total capital, militarism is a sphere of unproductive consumption. Instead of being saved, values are pulverised. Far from being a sphere of accumulation, militarism slows down accumulation. By means of indirect taxation a major share of the income of the working class which might have gone into the hands of the capitalists as surplus value is seized by the state and spent mainly for unproductive purposes.” On the other hand, though, apart from natural resources, the main resource the capitalists are fighting over in a war is human labour, enough of which is not available at home. What better way to decimate the wages of this new source of surplus value than through warfare? And as well as the destruction of capital value, innovation is accelerated by the arms race, leading to new use-values for the post- war civilian economy and furthering devaluation. Idealists claimed the fall of the Soviet Union would bring about a new era of world peace. The destruction of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen since then shows both that they did not appreciate the nature of imperialism or the protection the Soviet Union afforded to countries threatened by imperialism. Who is next for daring to seek independence? Venezuela? Iran? Russia and China have been encircled by NATO in the biggest build- up of military forces since the Second World War. As the crisis of accumulation deepens, the size and frequency of wars tend to grow. In the wake of 9/11, the author Zoltan Grossman circulated a list, based on Congressional Records and The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, of 133 US military interventions from 1890 to 2001. The average per year is 1.15 before, and 1.29 after, the Second World War. After the Cold War, from late 1989, the figure rises to 2.0. The Democrat Barack Obama replaced the gung-ho Republican warmonger George W Bush in 2008 promising ‘hope’ and ‘change’. But by the end of his second term in 2016, US special operators could be found in 70% – 138 – of the world’s nations, a huge jump of 130% since Bush left office. In 2016 alone, the Obama administration sanctioned the use of at least 26,171 bombs. “This means that every day last year, the US military blasted combatants or civilians overseas with 72 bombs; that’s three bombs every hour, 24 hours a day,” Medea Benjamin of the anti-war CodePink wrote in The Guardian.[500] In 2017, Trump – who in his April 2016 foreign policy speech said that “war and aggression will not be my first instinct” because he wanted to spend the money instead domestically to ‘make America great again’ – outstripped Obama’s 2016 figure by 9,000. Given that many of these wars are fought in an alliance of the imperialist powers, mainly through NATO, much analysis on the Left makes the mistake of thinking that inter-imperialist rivalry no longer exists. This follows on from Kautsky who, because he did not see war as arising from economic necessity, came up with a theory of “ultra- imperialism” whereby the imperialists would realise that it was not in their interests to continue the First World War and would therefore unite to “peaceably redivide the world". Something like this – to a limited extent – did temporarily emerge, but only after the Second World War, only in collective opposition to the Soviet Union, and during a period in which capitalism was recovering in the wake of the war’s devaluation of capital, meaning competition had temporarily diminished. But the barbaric aggression of the wars on the Middle East is symptomatic of deepening capitalist crisis and intensifying rivalry. Through their opposition to the 2003 war on Iraq, France and Germany showed that they are not subordinate to US interests. In the 1990s, TotalFinaElf, France’s huge oil firm, secured the contract to develop Iraq’s southern Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields, containing as much as 25% of the country's reserves. German firms were the market leaders in supplying sensitive dual-use technology to Iraq in the years before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and they had been bidding for more civilian commercial contracts. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, called Germany “the hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s”. France and Germany did not want new competition. Between the start of 2002 to March 2003 the dollar fell by 20% against the euro. The US had to respond to this: its international economic domination is bound up with the dollar’s strength as the world’s currency anchor. The dollar’s dominance as the main currency for foreign exchange enables it to blackmail countries that do not yield to its demands. Ultimately, the strength of a currency reflects the productivity and size of the economy behind it. Trump’s administration has claimed that Germany is using its currency to “exploit” both its neighbours and the US, sparking fears of a currency war. The US made the desperate accusation that Germany is “under-consuming” goods and services from other countries. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, the US made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the size of current account surpluses to 4% of GDP. Germany’s surplus overtook China’s in absolute size in 2017 and as a share of GDP became much larger. The IMF put Germany’s 2017 surplus as 8.1% of GDP and China’s at 1.6%. The EU’s surplus as a whole in 2017 was $387.1bn. In contrast, the US current account deficit was $462bn in 2017, bigger only than Britain’s $91.4bn. The deficit was 2.5% of GDP in the first quarter, up from 2.4% in the fourth quarter. Bush warned that the US would “neither forgive nor forget” if France continued to oppose the war on Iraq. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld accused Austria of blocking US troop movements from Germany to Italy and said the US was considering bringing home 100,000 troops stationed in Europe (70,000 in Germany) or relocating them to Eastern Europe. He threatened sanctions for “one reason only: to harm the German economy”. At the time, the US controlled 31.5% of world output to the EU’s 26%. However in 2004 ten additional countries were scheduled to join the 15 EU member states, a combination that would match the size of the US’s economy and exceed its population. FRFI – one of the few left-wing publications in Britain to anticipate the potential for conflict between the US and EU – reported in 2003 that total EU FDI already amounted to 52.5% of the world total, nearly 2.5 times that of the US. Over the period 1980-2001, the US share of the global total has halved. The massive rise in the US’s military spending has been necessitated by the need to reverse the decline of its economic dominance – to reiterate, if it doesn’t reverse this it won’t be able to valorise its capital. The Department of Defense’s base budget grew by 31% between 2000 and 2014. An $82bn hike to $716bn in 2018 represented an increase that by itself was larger than the entire defence budget of every country on earth, save China. Trump called the Defense Department’s annual budget “crazy” and proposed a 5% cut, but then committed to a $750bn budget for 2019. Who is really in charge? US military spending is at least 10 times the size of Russia’s, and four times the size of China’s. This is the same Department of Defense with a serious existing accounting problem. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion. Clearly this is unsustainable. As Engels says, “the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general”. US manufacturing output in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, constituted 27% of the economy and provided 24% of employment. In 2003 manufacturing amounted to 13.8% of its GDP, falling to 12.5% in 2015, and 10.5% of employment, falling to 8.8% in 2013. The US industrial base is shrinking and with it the manufacturing and engineering capacity to achieve military domination of the world. In November 2004 Le Monde Diplomatique reported that, “Some new (EU) states are large arms producers and exporters. The EU is now home to more than 400 companies in 23 countries manufacturing small arms and light weapons – hardly less than the US.” China’s manufacturing sector is now almost as large as those of the US, Japan and Germany combined. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 its military expenditure was almost $400bn; Iraq’s was $1.4bn, 0.35% of the US’s. In violation of the Iraqi constitution and international law the US-UK Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “laid off hundreds of thousands of Iraqi workers, virtually eliminated trade tariffs and enacted laws that radically alter Iraq’s economy. Order 39, decreed by CPA head Paul Bremer on September 20 2003, abolished Iraq's ban on foreign investment, allowing foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors except natural resources. Over 200 state-owned enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals have been privatised. Iraq's highest tax rate has been lowered from 45% to a flat rate of 15%. Although foreign ownership of land remains illegal, companies or individuals will be allowed to lease properties for up to 40 years.” The extraction of Iraq’s oil was also illegal. In 2011 government documents leaked to The Independent revealed that in November 2002, five months before the invasion, the UK Foreign Office invited BP to talks about opportunities in Iraq “post regime change”. Labour’s Baroness Symons, the then Trade Minister, promised BP that she would lobby the Bush administration because the oil giant feared it was being “locked out” of deals that Washington was quietly negotiating with the French and Russian governments and their energy firms. Control over territory, oil and oil transhipment routes is of paramount importance. With around 60% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East has been the key battleground. But this rivalry is playing out all over the world, in South America, Asia, Africa and, since the fall of the USSR, central and eastern Europe, which was identified by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 as “a stable and promising region for FDI”. China, whose contribution to global GDP was expected to eclipse that of the US in 2018, is a particular concern to the traditional powers because its strategy of offering low- or even interest-free loans in exchange for fixed-price sales of primary commodities makes it a more attractive business partner to underdeveloped countries who have been bled dry by high interest loans from the IMF. The US only has intimidation and force left to offer in response. In 2008, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a deal with China for roads, railways, clinics, hospitals, schools and two new universities worth $6bn. In exchange, China was given the right to extract 12 million tonnes of copper and cobalt over 25 years. In 2004, when Angola was reluctant to accept the terms of an IMF loan, China stepped in with a no-strings-attached $2bn. An Angolan minister said relations with China “not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect”. China has overtaken Britain, France and the US as a trading partner with Africa. In 2017, China’s trade with Africa was worth $170bn, four-times larger than US-Africa trade. China invested $125bn in Africa in the decade to 2016 and committed to $60bn more over the next three years. In 2017 China’s trade with Latin America reached $244bn, again exceeding that of the US. China’s dominance in manufacturing has forced Latin American countries to deindustrialise somewhat and focus on producing primary commodities; but China’s investments have also had the effect of strengthening their currencies relative to the dollar. In July 2016, the RAND Corporation think tank warned that, whereas the US would have been capable of achieving a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses in a war with China in 2015, China’s improving anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities meant that a war in 2025 would instead be “prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive”. The earlier part of that prediction seemed optimistic, given that the US became bogged down in the face of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan for years when it expected quick, decisive victories in both, against forces inferior to China’s. Indeed, in March 2019 a RAND analyst said that its war game simulations showed that “when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it”. He said it would cost an extra $24bn a year to turn things around. Chinese and Russian opposition to US deployments of anti-missile systems in Asia has resulted in their greater military cooperation. However, Russia is using its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to try and contain Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia, where it has regional ambitions of its own. As Trevor Rayne wrote in FRFI: “The US turns to alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia to confront China, but China offers them investments and better trade deals. If it has to the US ruling class will resort to military force to prevent China ejecting it from its dominant position in the world. Competition between the imperialist powers may be limited to geopolitical manoeuvring, ideological and cyber warfare and negotiation table diplomacy for now, but that cannot last forever. At some point the capitalist crisis will become so deep that the imperialist powers will be forced into direct confrontation with each other. The overaccumulation of capital will have become so great that the only way to sufficiently devalue capital and labour power will be through global conflagration. This tendency expresses itself in increasing competition between the imperialist powers as they vie to attain dominance – that is, to apportion losses to one another, to seize each other’s capital and resources by any means. This is what happened in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Great Depression and fascism were the counter-tendencies and crisis measures required over a span of 41 years to keep the accumulation process going and eventually revive it to a healthy enough level to restore political stability. Kautsky – because he believed accumulation was harmonious – claimed that absolute capitalist breakdown would be brought about inevitably by world war, which in his view would happen only because of uncivilised ruling classes.[513] On the other side of the same coin, Bukharin and Varga believed the Second World War would bring about the completion of the world revolution. This perhaps partly explains some of the controversial decisions taken by the Communist International after 1929, when it effectively ordered its national sections in Europe to take social democratic routes to socialism.[514] Grossman says: “It would be useless to search Bukharin for any other cause of the breakdown of capitalism than the ravages created by war.... If like Bukharin, we expect the breakdown of capitalism to flow from a second round of imperialist wars, then it is necessary to point out that wars are not peculiar to the imperialist stage of capitalism. They stem from the essence of capitalism as such, during all its stages, and have been a constant symptom of capital since its historical inception.... far from being a threat to capitalism, wars are a means of prolonging the existence of the capitalist system as a whole.” Grossman was at pains to show that Kautsky’s was a subjective analysis and that the opposite was true: that massive overaccumulation brought about a systemic breakdown and world war followed necessarily because it was the only way to sufficiently devalue capital, to “ward off imminent collapse” and “create a breathing space” for accumulation to restart. Grossman cites the figure from Wladimir Woytinsky’s 1925 book The World In Numbers that “around 35% of the wealth of mankind was destroyed and squandered in the four years” of the First World War, which had been preceded by a worldwide Long Depression – like the one we’re experiencing now – a series of economic ‘panics’ in the US, and intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries over trade routes and colonial territories. By the end of the war, says Grossman, the mass of living labour “confronted a reduced capital, and this created new scope for accumulation”. And yet it wasn’t enough – the 1929 Wall Street Crash followed, “a continuation of the unresolved economic crisis preceding World War One”, as Mattick says.[519] The New Deal attempted to resolve the crisis in the US and fascism attempted to resolve it in Germany (the equivalent of a New Deal in Germany through the SPD’s reforms having already failed before 1929). Neither worked. It would take an even more destructive global war to end the depression. This after Kautsky had claimed in 1927 that capitalism stood, “from a purely economic point of view, stronger than ever”.[520] The First World War – “legalised slaughter” in the apt words of Harry Patch, the last surviving combat soldier of that war from any country – killed 37 million people. The Second World War killed between 70 million and 85 million, 3% of the 1940 world population of an estimated 2.3 billion. The equivalent today from a world population of 7.53 billion would be 226 million. But given that today’s total accumulation and overaccumulation are considerably greater than before World War Two, it follows that it would take a considerably greater level of destruction to – again, temporarily – resolve the crisis. Given that and the fact that every major war following economic breakdown is decided only by total war (the US Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Crimean War being other prime examples), it could be argued that the amount of destruction required is so high now that today’s deepening crisis may at some point necessitate nothing short of a nuclear exchange between the imperialist powers. The Second World War ended with the US dropping the A-bomb on Japan, after all. If World War Three was not sufficiently destructive, then a bigger crisis would follow necessitating World War Four, just as World War Two followed World War One. And of course a Fourth World War would be necessitated at some point anyway. This is all assuming that the crisis that preceded a World War Three wasn’t the final breakdown, the absolute historical limit of capital accumulation. If it were then no amount of destruction could save capitalism. As we said earlier, this is surely now the case – there can be no 1945 productivity boom that breathes another century of life into the system, for automation has already all but abolished the law of value. The current arms race is in fact already accelerating the development of automation and therefore the rate of profit’s historical fall towards zero. We therefore assert that – aside from the fact that a world war today would end life on Earth and destroy the climate for good – even a world war cannot save capitalism this time. Rather than trying to destroy itself in order to renew itself this time, capitalism is now preparing to either destroy or wind itself up for good. Trade wars will continue to intensify. Protectionism becomes an increasingly inevitable reflex as nations attempt to defend domestic and overseas assets; combined with stagnant productivity, this tends to manifest politically in a parochial, ‘anti-globalisation’ nationalism, ie right-wing populism or proto-fascism, as capitalists which rely more on the domestic market – determining their conservatism – finally gain the upper-hand over the more liberal exporting sectors, only to deepen the overall economic crisis by making trade increasingly expensive and centralising capital into yet fewer hands. As Michael Pettis wrote in the FT in 2009, the fact that “nearly everyone agrees that a world that retreats into direct and indirect forms of trade protection is a world that is worse off... should not allay our worries. In the 1930s, it was also well understood that the crisis would be exacerbated by plunging international trade. This did not stop a descent into the protectionism which put the ‘Great’ into the Great Depression.” In February 2019, a senior European Commission economist warned that a Third World War is an increasingly “high probability” due to the “disintegration of global capitalism”.[523] Professor Hanappi, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration , noted that the emerging trade wars, massive growth of military spending and return of ‘populism’ bear unnerving similarities with trends that beset the world before the outbreak of the first two world wars. Marx wrote that as soon as capital feels itself threatened it will “seek refuge in other forms”, which appear to perfect its rule as capital “through curbs on free competition”; although the curbs on competition “appear to complete the mastery of capital, they are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the mode of production based on it”.[524] This applies to both the monopolistic stage of capitalism and the inevitability of protectionism. As mentioned, in 2015-16, the G20 economies introduced a record number of trade-restrictive measures. Globalisation was in retreat before Brexit and Trump, because its ability to expand capital is increasingly exhausted. Just as protectionism and trade wars were precursors of the first two world wars, Brexit and Trump’s trade wars threaten to be precursors of a Third World War. Just as the first two world wars were fought between the biggest imperialist rivals, so would a third. That would mean a conflict between the US and its strongest competitor, the German-led EU. On 6 November 2018 France President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” so that the EU could defend itself from “China, Russia and even the United States of America”, adding: “When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty[525] which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security.” Germany already provides the most troops for the UN’s so-called peacekeeping missions. Building on the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) agreement – which allows co-operation on joint military projects for 25 EU member states, established through the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017 – the European Commission provisionally agreed the founding of a €13bn European Defence Fund (EDF) in February. This is to allow joint R&D projects for European companies. Though no formal agreement is to come into effect until November 2019, it is already known that the fund will exclude both post-Brexit Britain and the US. In response the US complained that the moves undermine the NATO alliance and threatened sanctions on EU firms if either project goes ahead. The EU told the the US not to concern itself with Europe's defence plans. In December 2019 Macron said NATO was already “brain dead”, because “you have no co-ordination of decision-making whatsoever between the US and its NATO allies”. In reality, Europe is still reliant upon the US in military matters, a point made clear by, for example, the dominance of US firms in international contracts or the US’s role in NATO. Accordingly, the EU is, to some degree, split upon the US’s INF withdrawal, with key US allies Britain and Poland offering their unwavering support for the move. While disagreement in Europe over the Treaty itself is small, this reflects broader splits within the EU imperialist bloc, more evident in regard to trade and inter-European political discussions. More significantly in military terms, the US’s dominance over Europe’s military capacity means that Europe requires both time and new alliances if it is to stand on its own feet. Europe is now waking up to this. In July, Macron announced that France would build “a large space command within the Air Force, which will eventually become the Air and Space Force... to better protect our satellites, including in an active way”. Analysts called the move a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture. Macron's proposal follows similar moves by the US, China and Russia in recent years. In 2018, Trump ordered the formation of a sixth branch of the US’s armed forces – a "space force”. Europe's imperialists may have once hoped that the end of Trump's Presidency could see a reconciliation with the US bourgeoisie on more advantageous terms, but such hopes seem to be nothing but a fantasy. On 13 November 2018, a bipartisan panel for the US Congress issued a report stating its approval of the Trump administration's pursuit of “great power competition”. In March 2019, Nicole Gibson, Deputy Director of the US State Department’s office for Europe, warned that European companies would “risk significant sanctions” if they resume laying pipe for the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Construction work was suspended in the December because of winter weather. The deal has infuriated the US because it undermines the potential for its energy giants to export surplus shale gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, US clients in central Europe are also set to lose out. Snaking under the Baltic Sea, NS2 replaces an older pipeline, stripping Ukraine of gas transit fees worth $2.5bn a year, 4% of its GDP. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko[526] fears NS2 would allow Russia to switch off gas to Ukraine and Central Europe to blackmail its nearer neighbours without disrupting supplies to Western Europe, enabling the Kremlin to exert greater political influence. Russia supplies more than one-third of the natural gas Europe uses, a figure that is expected to reach nearly 50% in the next decade. German businesses say NS2 will slash their energy costs. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that “geostrategically, Europe cannot have an interest in cutting off all relations with Russia”. In 2017 she said that “the times in which we could completely depend on [the US and Britain] are, to a certain extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” With the relative decline of the US and Britain’s pending departure from the EU, Germany either sees an opportunity to become dominant or the need to find more reliable allies. It may see an alliance with Russia as an extension of European imperialism, and as a replacement for Britain, which itself has reportedly sought to spread misinformation in Europe in an attempt to weaken relations between Germany and Russia.[527] Turkey too, a long time client state of the US, appears to be forming a new alliance with Russia and Germany. In June 2019, the EU and Russia started talks on transitioning to using the rouble and euro in bilateral payments instead of the US dollar. China and Turkey are also investing heavily in the euro. The US is gradually being isolated and the grip on the world economy that the dollar as the world currency anchor gives the US is slipping. In the same week, it emerged that the US had been stepping up its ability to wage a cyberwar on Russia’s power grid, something it had deployed against Venezuela several times, depriving hospitals, factories and residential areas of electricity, earlier in the year. These cyber attacks are acts of war by the US’s own definition. A similar situation is developing with regards to Iran.[528] When Trump pulled the US out of the 2013 Iran nuclear deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions, Germany, France and even, to the chagrin of the US, Britain – all desperate for outlets for profitable investment – denounced the move and vowed to find ways to circumvent the US ban on trading with Iran, which applies to third parties. In July Russia expressed interest in the EU’s proposed Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, backing Iran’s demand that it would have to include the oil trade. Significantly, this would see the EU violating US sanctions on two fronts. Trump claims he is trying to stop a nuclear arms race in the Middle East but he is really motivated by competition. In March 2019, Miguel Berger, the Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, complained that, while everyone else was banned from trading with Iran, US trade with Iran in 2018 had in fact doubled. The US says it wants a new deal that curbs Iran’s ballistic missile programme and ends Iran’s supposed influence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the latter in which it is accused of backing the anti-imperialist Houthi movement. But it also wants to control Iran’s oil. The US’s increasingly belligerent client-states Israel and Saudi Arabia see Iran as a threat to their regional dominance and welcomed Trump’s move. [529] In May 2019 Trump warned Iran of “severe consequences” as the US, joined by Britain, began to build up naval and air power in the Persian Gulf. Fears of military conflict grew after Trump blamed Iran for Houthi attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. While Britain – which, in a blatant act of piracy at the request of the US, later seized an Iranian oil tanker bound for Syria – sided with the US, the EU demanded an independent inquiry. Japan, which had a tanker involved in the controversy, also questioned the veracity of the US’s account. The same week, Iran shot down a US drone. Trump claimed that he called off a retaliatory airstrike at the last minute, instead imposing further suffocating sanctions and launching a cyberattack on Iran’s defence infrastructure. Sanctions have resulted in inflation in Iran of 40% and the IMF predicted a 6% contraction in its economy. Iran said it would have to develop its uranium enrichment levels if Europe did not do more shield Iran from sanctions.[530] Iran could be the spark that ignites conflict between the US and Europe.[531] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s US-UK-backed war on Yemen has resulted, after four years, in what the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; and rising tensions between India and Pakistan at the beginning of 2019 threaten to spill over into a full-scale war, with the US generally backing the former and China the latter. Pakistan has taken out billions of dollars in loans from China in recent years as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious trade and infrastructure network connecting China to Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions. China has pledged to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, which has been bailed out by high- interest IMF loans some 14 times since 1980. The task of communists As we have said, Leninists have long predicted that these deepening splits would emerge. They have been proven correct, and the defeatist pseudo-Marxist theories of ‘ultra-imperialism’ – that the imperialist powers in fact form an unshakeable alliance – have been proven wrong. Existing divisions in NATO have been widening since the election of Trump, who has been unsurprisingly delighted by Brexit and its destabilising effect on the EU. Denouncing the EU’s “treatment” of Britain in the negotiations, Trump said at the start of April 2019 that “the EU is likewise a brutal trading partner with the US, which will change”. On 9 April he said the US planned to impose tariffs of $11bn (£8.4bn) on EU goods, partly because “EU subsidies to Airbus have adversely impacted the US”.[532] He must have known what was coming: on 10 April the EU and China announced a very significant trade deal in which they vowed, in a thinly veiled rebuke to the US, “to fight against unilateralism and protectionism”. China and Germany are now engaged in concrete military co-operation, with China deploying armoured vehicles on German soil for joint drills on 11 July, something that has been unthinkable until now.[533] At the same time, the potential for realignment with the US is also contained within the German approach. For example, the nation is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, escalating tensions with China and easing them with the US. As Trump is so fond of saying, “all options are on the table”. France has vowed to retaliate tit-for-tat against US sanctions. In Tony Kennedy’s foreword to the abridged 1992 English reprint of Grossman’s book, he says: “For Grossman, re-presenting Marx’s theory was no mere academic exercise. Nor was he concerned merely with describing tendencies towards periodic economic crises, of a more or less restricted character, nor even with trends towards more systematic and global recessions. He aimed to show that the essence of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society was the identification of the inexorable tendency towards breakdown as the fundamental characteristic of the social system as a whole.... Grossman contended that the socialist movement’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalism required theoretical proof of the system’s tendency towards breakdown.” This is now the task facing communists today. The first appeal that the Communist International made in 1920 to the international working class was to “Remember the imperialist war!”, warning that the repetition of such destructive wars, when the workers of different countries are coerced by the ruling classes to “cut each other’s throats” is not only possible but inevitable if capitalism is not overthrown.[536] The First World War confirmed what was written in the statutes of the First International, that the emancipation of the working class is not a local, nor a national, but an international question. And given that national bourgeoisies are inevitably pitted against each other in a world war, it follows that the only class that is capable of solidarity internationally is the working class. Nation-states will either respond to the looming crash as it deepens by cutting military expenditure drastically or waging war in a bid to offset economic losses – or perhaps by doing both. We are being haunted by the failure to turn the breakdowns that precipitated the first two world wars into the world revolution that Lenin expected to follow on the heels of the one he led in Russia. Only world socialism can ensure humanity’s survival.

#### The Impact to their ableist rhetoric is Internalized ableism, where passing is used by academics to hide their impairments so that they aren’t seen as needy or troublemakers. This is a community based impact whose proximity means that you should be prioritize it over any of their big stick or external discussions.

**Campbell 08** (Fiona Kumari Campbell, disability author and professor at Griffith University, “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Disability & Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, March 2008, 151–162) sbb

In the case of disability subjectification internalization of negative ontologies of disability contributes to the formation of a docile and readily pliable disabled body, continuing in various ways to inhibit performances of disability acceptance and rehabilitation so demanded by the inclusivist impulses of liberal contract theory. Internalized ableism can mean the disabled subject is caught ‘between a rock and a hard place’; in order to attain the benefit of a ‘disabled identity’ one must constantly participate in processes of disability disavowal, aspiring towards normativity, a state of near ablebodiedness, or at very least to effect a state of ‘passing’. As Kimberlyn Leary (1999, 85) put it: Passing occurs when there is perceived danger in disclosure. … It **represents a form of self-protection that nevertheless usually disables, and sometimes destroys, the self it means to safeguard**. The workings of internalized ableism by way of ‘passing’ are only possible when viewed broadly, moving the focus from the impaired individual to the arena of relationships. In the interactivity with the norm (such as an ableized able-bodied person) another form of erasure is required. Ableist passing is not just an individual hiding their impairment or morphing their disability; ableism involves a failure to ask about difference, i.e. disability/impairment. For internalized ableism to occur there needs to be an existing a priori presumption of compulsory ableness. Such passing is about keeping the colonizer happy by not disturbing the peace, containing the matter that is potentially out of place.1 An example of ‘passing’ under these circumstances would be the conundrum encountered by some **university academics with impairments who experience trepidation about revealing their impairment status, fearing stigma and** tenure discrimination despite the fact that many argue that they and others would benefit from disability focused mentoring and networking arrangements (see Bishop 1999; Monaghan 1998).

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#### Anti-trust is the next step in perfecting American empire---discourses of competition and innovation turn the state into a competitive entity in the global economy, solidifying a state-corporate nexus that cements elite power.

Fougner 6, Associate Professor of International Relations @ Bilkent University (Tore, The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalization: Is There a Future Beyond “The Competition State,” *Review of International Studies*, No. 32, DOI: 10.1017/S0260210506006978)

Neoliberal global governance and international competitiveness

The changes in both the meaning of international competitiveness and the terms of international competitiveness as a governmental problem discussed above can to some extent be seen to follow also from contemporary efforts to govern the world economy in accordance with a neoliberal rationality of government.52 In short, this governmental rationality can be characterised as one within which governance is reflected on with the aid of a vocabulary that includes ‘competition’, ‘market’, ‘freedom’, ‘choice’, ‘customer orientation’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘flexibility’ as core concepts; ‘the market’ is constituted as the ideal in relation to which governance should be oriented; it is accepted that markets can exist only under specific political, legal and institutional conditions that must be actively established by authorities; individual and/or individualised entities are constituted and acted upon as flexible and manipulable subjects with a rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour; the main responsibility for economic activity is ascribed to private market actors; and interventions in such activity on the part of authorities are, if accepted at all, given a theoretical justification based on ideas of market failure or imperfection.

With regard to contemporary reflections and practices on the part of the key international organisations engaged in ‘the management of the global economy’ or ‘global economic policy-making’ (such as the WTO, the IMF, the IBRD and, more indirectly, the OECD), there should be little doubt that a seemingly free and self-regulating global market is constituted as the ideal in relation to which governance should be oriented.53 Moreover, and in spite of the tendency to naturalise or depoliticise the establishment of an open and competitive global marketplace with reference to ‘technological developments’ and ‘market integration’, there is a fairly clear acknowledgement that the realisation of a global marketplace is dependent not only on active state dismantling of barriers to the free flow of goods, services and capital, but also on the putting in place of the basic political, legal and institutional framework in and through which a market is constituted (property rights, contract rights, and so on) and policed on a continuous basis (competition policy).

The acknowledgement of a global marketplace not being self-constitutive is perhaps most evident in the inclusion of ‘competition policy’ on the WTO’s agenda during the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. Its inclusion rests to a very large extent on the recognition that competitive behaviour on the part of firms is not something that follows automatically or naturally from a removal of state barriers to the free flow of goods, services and capital. Rather, and as reflected also in the presence of sizeable competition authorities in all so-called market economies, such behaviour must be not only regulated into being, but also policed on a continuous basis. As noted in a report prepared by WTO’s Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy:

The very rationale for discussing competition policy in the context of the WTO was, in fact, the concern that once government policy-induced restrictions were removed through the implementation by Members of the Uruguay Round commitments, the vacated space might be occupied by private enterprises of an anti-competitive nature.54

While the above implies that states and inter-statal authorities are ascribed a central role in connection with the constitution and policing of a competitive global marketplace, it is explicitly or implicitly given that the responsibility for economic activities as such should rest solely with a private-capitalist business community. In spite of this, however, and despite also what seems to be a growing tendency to conceive of ‘government failure’ as being a greater problem than ‘market failure’, there remains as of today an opening for ‘market interventions’ in accordance with a theoretical argument based on the idea of market failure. As for instance noted by Deputy Managing Director Eduardo Aninat of the IMF, ‘there can be no substitute for supranational efforts to tackle those aspects of globalisation – financial contagion, global warming or marginalisation and social exclusion – that markets can still only imperfectly deal with’.55

In the context of the present article, the important point to note is that the increasingly prominent conception of international competitiveness in terms of ‘attractiveness’ presupposes (re)locational freedom on the part of capital, and that the granting and securing of such freedom is integral to ongoing efforts to govern the world economy according to a neoliberal rationality of government. Although there is currently no comprehensive multilateral framework in place to secure the operational freedom of capital on a planetary scale – an unfortunate result, some might say, of the collapse of the OECD-initiated negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 – FDI-related conditions attached to structural adjustment loans, the steadily growing number of very similar bilateral investment treaties, and the creeping multilateralisation of FDI-related rules within the WTO are de facto bringing the world in that direction.56

International competitiveness and neoliberal governance of states

While efforts to govern the world economy according to a neoliberal rationality of government have contributed to pave the way for the prominent position of ‘attractiveness’ in contemporary reflections on international competitiveness, the contemporary discourse on international competitiveness is central to how states themselves are increasingly subjected to a form of neoliberal governance in the world political economy – this in the sense that they are constituted and acted upon as flexible and manipulable market actors in and through it. In order to place this claim in a broader perspective, a closer look at how the state is constituted as a sovereign, (self)disciplined and competitive entity in connection with contemporary efforts at neoliberal global governance is warranted.

The state as a sovereign entity

Within the context of neoliberal global governance, it can initially be argued that the state is constituted as a sovereign juridico-political entity – this as a consequence of the role that states and/or things inter-statal are ascribed in connection with the constitution and regulation of a global marketplace. The main point here is not that the state is somehow pre- or self-constituted as a sovereign entity, but rather that the entry into intergovernmental regulatory schemes and participation in multilateral organisations make up central elements in the continuous practice in and through which a state is constituted as sovereign vis-à-vis other co-sovereignised states. Moreover, states (as governments) are also presumed to be sovereign vis-à-vis the subjects of the state, since the effectiveness of international regulatory schemes depend on the state’s ability to put them into practice domestically.

The state as a (self)disciplined entity

Beyond its constitution as sovereign, the state is constituted also as a (self)disciplined entity in connection with contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace. In more specific terms, it is thus constituted in relation to both international rules and norms, and globally mobile or footloose capital. The former kind of discipline concerns the constraints that a set of international rules and norms place on the policy options available to state authorities. If the rules and norms in question are considered in relation to intergovernmental agreements, then the constraints follow from a state’s legal obligations under international economic law. In this connection, the actions and policies on the part of state authorities are subjected to continuous surveillance by other parties to the agreements and/or the bodies authorised to oversee them, and disciplinary measures are expected to follow in the case that they break with international law. While there is nothing new in (self)discipline on the part of states in relation to interstate law and agreements, certain developments in the field of international economic law imply both a broadening of constraints and a strengthening of disciplinary enforcement mechanisms.

This is undoubtedly the case with the WTO-agreement of 1994, which has been considered by supporters and critics alike as performing constitutional functions and/or being an incipient global economic constitution.57 While supporters inspired by public choice theory or constitutional economics consider such constitutionalism to serve as a counterbalance to the influence of protectionist or anti-globalist interest groups on state decision-making processes,58 critics like Stephen Gill consider the ‘new constitutionalism’ in question as an essentially undemocratic means through which neoliberal reforms are ‘locked-in’, and state authorities and people in general are handcuffed in relation to a seemingly autonomous economic sphere of reality at the global level.59 Whichever way one wants to see it, the constitutionalism in question is not just any kind of constitutionalism, but a neoliberal one that conceives of a constitution solely as a means to impose limits on state authorities.60

With respect to the second kind of discipline, the issue concerns the constraints that the mobility of capital is claimed to have placed on the policy options available to state authorities. Although this form of discipline is most often portrayed as something involuntary by representatives of state authorities, it should be fairly obvious that it follows more or less automatically from the neoliberal efforts to constitute a global marketplace in general, and to ‘liberate’ the flow and operation of capital and investments in particular. Expressed somewhat differently, once capital is reconstituted at a global level, state authorities can seemingly not do much else but either discipline themselves in relation to, or forcefully be disciplined by, the ‘global logic’ of so-called market forces:

In today’s borderless economy, the workings of the ‘invisible hand’ have a reach and strength beyond anything Adam Smith ever could have imagined. . . . [E]conomic activity is what defines the landscape on which all other institutions, including political institutions, must operate. . . . [T]he often instantaneous movement of people, ideas, information, and capital across borders means that decisions are swayed by the threat that needed resources [or economic activity] will go elsewhere.61

Certain forms of short-term portfolio investments and credit arrangements aside, the ‘quicksilver’ nature often ascribed to contemporary capital and investments is in no way beyond question.62 In spite of this, state authorities can hardly know exactly what it takes for various forms of capital to react negatively and fly or shy away from its territory. With regard to (self)discipline on the part of state authorities, this uncertainty can in itself do the trick: Knowing that the ‘capacity’ on the part of capital to move is there,63 knowing that they and their policies are being scrutinised and surveilled on a continuous basis by a vast array of private-capitalist institutions (firms, banks, credit-rating agencies, political risk analysts, and so on), knowing that each and every ‘wrong’ move on their part will be instantaneously registered and circulated, and thinking and being told that such moves might provoke a negative reaction on the part of capital claimed to be globally footloose – state authorities can easily reach the conclusion that self-restraint is the most feasible policy option.

The state as a competitive entity

Though somewhat more indirectly, the state is constituted also as a competitive entity in connection with contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace. While some might consider this a mere by-product of the state’s constitution as a (self)disciplined entity – this in the sense that the state is left with no option but to compete for capital – the argument made here is that the state is constituted and acted upon as a flexible and manipulable market actor in and through the discourse on international competitiveness. With international competitiveness conceived in terms of ‘attractiveness’, the state is commodified,64 and statesmanship is transformed into salesmanship – not in the old ‘trade mission’ sense of promoting the products and services of ‘national’ firms in external markets, but in the sense of selling the state as a location to globally footloose capital and firms. With ‘selling’ understood in the broad sense of developing, branding, promoting, marketing and selling a product, the state is constituted as a competitor and entrepreneur operating in a global ‘market for investment’.65

According to neoliberal public choice theory, the constitution of states as such competitive and entrepreneurial entities approximates a normative ideal. The reason for this is that what Horst Siebert has called ‘locational competition’66 is often considered ‘a substitute for more overt attempts to contain a government’s Leviathan tendencies such as constitutional amendments’.67 Assuming both that ‘countries can benefit economically from luring factors into their jurisdiction’, and that ‘[i]ndividuals may ‘‘vote by their feet’’ and move either themselves or capital to the most preferred jurisdiction’, state authorities ‘will, driven by their self interest, compete in offering favorable rules and institutions . . . to mobile factors’.68 Although current conditions approximate their normative ideal, public choice theorists can nevertheless be expected to identify the following deficiency in locational competition of the kind discussed above: since competitive behaviour is considered as unnatural for state authorities as it is for firms, ‘[c]ompetition among governments, like competition among firms, cannot be left to itself’:69

Horizontal competition among governments not only requires the removal of barriers to trade, capital movements, and migration and the enforcement of private contracts in inter-state commerce and finance. State governments must not only be prevented from protecting their territorial tax and regulatory monopolies against interjurisdictional substitution by the market. They must also be prevented from setting up tax and regulatory cartels among themselves. Moreover, if horizontal competition is not to be distorted, the competing governments must not be permitted to impose negative non-market externalities – like war, pollution, claim-jumping or cost-raising majority decisions – on each other.70

Although there is currently no federal or supranational authority in place to arrange and police the efficient operation of locational competition among states, there are plenty of actors that work to (re)constitute and act on states as flexible and manipulable market actors on a continuous basis.71 These include IGOs like the OECD, UNCTAD and development banks, whose policy guidelines are often framed in terms of the need of states to compete for footloose capital;72 institutions like the IMD and the WEF, whose competitiveness indices function as benchmarks with respect to the relative ability of states to attract footloose capital;73 scholars from various branches of Business Administration, whose ‘how-to-compete’ knowledge is adapted to and targeted at states-as-competitors;74 consultancy and public relations firms, whose services are promoted vis-à-vis state authorities with reference to their need to compete for footloose capital;75 and individual firms, whose bidding contests or ‘locational tournaments’ in connection with particular investments pit two or more locations against each other.76 Furthermore, and partly in response to the above, state authorities throughout the world have increasingly equipped themselves with national competitiveness councils, national competitiveness reports, investment promotion agencies and so on, in and through which they (re)constitute and act on themselves and their populations as competitive and entrepreneurial ‘place-sellers’ in a global market for investment.77

With regard to state policies and institutions, the shift from aggressiveness to attractiveness in reflections on international competitiveness can be claimed to stimulate both convergence and divergence. On the one hand, locational competition stimulates convergence as state authorities increasingly compare their policies and institutions to those of competitors, and seek to adopt the ‘best practice’ or ‘best offer’ around in order to remain in the locational game. The necessity of being attentive to ‘the needs of the market’ is alpha and omega, and given the policies and institutions considered to be of general importance in attracting capital – security and freedom for capital, a stable and predictable legislative environment, a supportive material and technological infrastructure, a well-educated workforce, and a businessfriendly environment in general (low corporate taxes, flexible labour markets, and so on) – this makes for a certain degree of convergence towards neoliberal state governance.

On the other hand, locational competition also stimulates divergence of a kind, as it becomes of paramount importance for states to stand out as different and better in order to appear attractive in the eyes of capital. In spite of this, however, the option of being different is increasingly constrained as a result of not only the competitive market logic mentioned above, but also how intergovernmental regulatory schemes dig deeper and deeper into what was previously conceived as a ‘domestic’ sphere, and leave less and less space for policies and institutional arrangements that break significantly with the neoliberal norm. Differences do remain, but it is increasingly a question of cosmetic brand-and-packaging differences within the context of the state’s constitution as a dual ‘entrepreneurial state’ – that is, one in which state authorities seek not only to promote entrepreneurship within a ‘national’ space, but also to act entrepreneurially in developing and selling that space as a place-commodity in a global marketplace.78

To round off this discussion on state salesmanship, it should be mentioned that it must to some extent also take residents at large into consideration. The reason for this is not merely that they are part and parcel of the product to be sold, nor that they have the undemocratic privilege to ‘vote with their feet’, but rather that they might rebel and undermine a particular strategy to sell a state. With place-selling being a question not of selling a place with a given identity or product qualities, but rather of the representational and material adaptation of a place to that which is assumed to attract capital, the potential for resistance follows from both how all placeconstructions can be contested and made subject to conflict, and how the reality effects of place-representation and -adaptation are likely to vary among different groups of people.79 Against this background, the ‘economic logic’ through which a place is marketed and sold as something attractive for globally footloose capital must be complemented with a ‘social logic’ through which immobile residents are given a sense of being part of a successful community.80 In this connection, it is somewhat paradoxical to note that the very discourse necessitating such ‘engineering [of] social consensus’81 – that is, the discourse of international competitiveness – seems to have become increasingly central in contemporary processes of identity construction at both state and regional levels.82

Conclusion

The basic idea informing this article has been that the transgression of something that is currently conceived as a given ‘fact of life’ can be facilitated by showing both that what is, has not always been and, in consequence, need not always be in the future; and that what is, is internal not to an unchanging nature, but rather to politics or relations of power. In accordance with this, the article has showed that the problem of international competitiveness has a quite specific history of emergence and transformation internal to state and global forms of governance, and that the discourse of international competitiveness is currently at the centre not only of how state authorities conduct their business, but also how their conduct is shaped and manipulated by other actors in the world political economy.

The broader significance of this (re)problematisation of the problem of international competitiveness lies in its potential contribution to the opening up of a space of possibility for the state to become something other than a competitive entity. In this connection, the issue at stake today is not so much the absence of state conceptions that somehow run counter to the neoliberal one of the state as a competitive entity, as the hegemonic position of the neoliberal problem and discourse of competitiveness as such. If the latter is left unchallenged, as is the case in much of the competition state literature, then alternative state conceptions will unavoidably be assessed in terms of international competitiveness and, in consequence, stand little chance of prevailing in any but distorted and marginal ways.83 Against this background, the historisation and politicisation of the problem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contribute both to make the concept of international competitiveness fall from its current grace, and increase people’s receptivity to both existing and prospective alternatives to the neoliberal conception of the state.

With regard to the prospect of the state becoming something other than a competitve entity, an opening might also follow from how the state has been shown to be constituted as a three-headed troll that is competitive, disciplined and sovereign within the context of contemporary efforts at neoliberal global governance. As sovereign entities, states retain the option to put an end to capital mobility, and thereby both reverse the power relationship that currently characterises their relations with transnational capital, and deny non-state actors the opportunity to act upon and manipulate their conduct at a distance. The key point to note, however, is that the hegemony of neoliberalism as a rationality of government has led states to practice sovereignty in a way that effectively subjects them to such external discipline and governance – this, by engaging in efforts to constitute a global marketplace. Moreover, neoliberal global governance is considered such a precious undertaking today that state authorities have voluntarily, if not proactively, adapted to it by both exercising a high degree of self-discipline, and acting on themselves and their populations as competitors in a global market for investment.

While an understanding of the state as an externally disciplined entity has the potential to stimulate popular opposition and resistance to contemporary forms of neoliberal global governance – in part, because many people simply do not appreciate being forced to do things that they otherwise would not want to do – this understanding seems at present to be much less prevalent in the popular imagination than the one of the state as a competitive entity. Given both the seemingly ahistorical and apolitical nature of the problem of international competitiveness, and how the quest for improved competitiveness can rather easily be represented as part of a positive national project, this situation can be claimed to inhibit the emergence of more broadly-based popular resistance.84 Against this background, the (re)problematisation of the problem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contribute to delegitimise attempts to rally people behind national competitiveness projects, and provide additional stimulus to popular opposition and resistance to contemporary efforts to constitute a global marketplace.85

In the final analysis, however, the possibility for the state to become something other than a competitive entity is likely to depend also on a more general de-hegemonisation of neoliberalism as a rationality of government. The reason for this is that the constitution and governance of the state as a competitive entity is most properly considered as integral to a more comprehensive process in and through which subjects of various kinds are thus constituted and governed in all spheres and at all levels of social life. As of today, economic logic has so successfully colonised human thought and conduct that it seems unlikely that decolonisation related to states and interstate relations can be achieved if the logic as such continues to reign almost supreme in social life more generally. Considered in this broader context, the present article makes but a modest contribution to more comprehensive efforts aimed at enabling individuals and collectivities alike to break free from an increasingly imperialistic neoliberal governmentality.

#### Modern socialism has lost the ongoing struggle – a return to the roots of Marxism is necessary

Foster 2020, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy, 09-2020, “The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 72 (4): 1–13. doi:10.14452/MR-072-04-2020-08\_1.)

The Polarization of the Class System

In the United States, key sectors of monopoly-finance capital have now succeeded in mobilizing elements of the primarily white lower-middle class in the form of a nationalist, racist, misogynist ideology. The result is a nascent neofascist political-class formation, capitalizing on the long history of structural racism arising out of the legacies of slavery, settler colonialism, and global militarism/imperialism. This burgeoning neofas- cism’s relation to the already existing neoliberal political formation is that of “enemy brothers” characterized by a fierce jockeying for power coupled with a common repression of the working class.’ It is these con- ditions that have formed the basis of the rise of the New York real-estate ‘mogul and billionaire Donald Trump as the leader of the so-called radical right, leading to the imposition of right-wing policies and a new authori- tarian capitalist regime. Even if the neoliberal faction of the ruling class ‘wins out in the coming presidential election, ousting ‘Trump and replac- ing him with Joe Biden, a neoliberal-neofascist alliance, reflecting the internal necessity of the capitalist class, will likely continue to form the basis of state power under monopoly-finance capital.

‘Appearing simultaneously with this new reactionary political forma- tion in the United States is a resurgent movement for socialism, based in the working-class majority and dissident intellectuals. The demise of U.S. hegemony within the world economy, accelerated by the globalization of production, has undermined the former, imperial-based labor aristocracy among certain privileged sections of the working class, leading to a re- surgence of socialism.? Confronted with what Michael D. Yates has called “the Great Inequality,” the mass of the population in the United States, particularly youth, are faced with rapidly diminishing prospects, finding themselves in a state of uncertainty and often despair, marked by a dra- matic increase in “deaths of despair.” They are increasingly alienated from a capitalist system that offers them no hope and are attracted to socialism as the only genuine alternative." Although the US situation is unique, similar objective forces propelling a resurgence of socialist move- ments are occurring elsewhere in the system, primarily in the Global South, in an era of continuing economic stagnation, financialization, and universal ecological decline. But if socialism is seemingly on the rise again in the context of the structural crisis of capital and increased class polarization, the ques- tion is: What kind of socialism? In what ways does socialism for the twenty-first century differ from socialism of the twentieth century? Much of what is being referred to as socialism in the United States and elsewhere is of the social-democratic variety, seeking an alliance with left-liberals and thus the existing order, in a vain attempt to make capitalism work better through the promotion of social regulation and social welfare in direct opposition to neoliberalism, but at a time when neoliberalism is itself giving way to neofascism. Such movements are bound to fail at the outset in the present historical context, inevitably betraying the hopes that they unleashed, since focused on mere elec- toral democracy. Fortunately, we are also seeing the growth today of a genuine socialism, evident in extra-electoral struggle, heightened mass action, and the call to go beyond the parameters of the present system, so as to reconstitute society as whole.

‘The general unrest latent at the base of US. society was manifested in the uprisings in late May and June of this year, which took the form, practically unheard of in US. history since the US. Civil War, of massive solidarity protests with millions of people in the streets, and with the white working class, and white youth in particular, crossing the color line en ‘masse in response to the police lynching of George Floyd for no other crime than being a Black man. This event, coming in the midst of the COVID-9 pandemic and the related economic depression, led to the June days of rage in the United States.

But while the movement toward socialism, now taking hold even in the United States at the “barbaric heart” of the system, is gaining ground as a result of objective forces, it lacks an adequate subjective basis. A major obstacle in formulating strategic goals of socialism in the world today has to do with twentieth-century socialism’s abandonment of its own ideals as originally articulated in Karl Marx’s vision of communism. ‘To understand this problem, it is necessary to go beyond recent left at- tempts to address the meaning of communism on a philosophical basis, a question that has led in the last decade to abstract treatments of The Com- ‘munist Idea, The Communist Hypothesis, and The Communist Horizon by Alain Badiou and others“ Rather, a more concrete historically based starting point is necessary, focusing directly on the two-phase theory of socialist) communist development that emerged out of Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme and V. I. Lenin’s The State and Revolution. Paul M. Sweezy’s arti- cle “Communism as an Ideal,” published more than half a century ago in ‘Monthly Review in October 1963, is now a classic text in this regard."

Marx's Communism as the Socialist Ideal

In The Critique of the Gotha Programme —written in opposition to the econ- omistic and laborist notions of the branch of German Social Democracy in- fluenced by Ferdinand Lassalle— Marx designated two historical “phases” in the struggle to create a society of associated producers. The first phase ‘was initiated by the “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,” reflect- ing the class-war experience of the Paris Commune and representing a period of workers’ democracy, but one that still carried the “defects” of capitalist class society. In this initial phase, not only would a break with capitalist private property take place, but also a break with the capitalist state as the political command structure of capitalism.” As a measure of the limited nature of socialist transition in this stage, production and dis- tribution would inevitably take the form of to each according to one’s labor, perpetuating conditions of inequality even while creating the conditions for their transcendence. In contrast, in the later phase, the principle gov- erning society would shift to from each according to one’s ability, to each accord- ‘ng to one’s need and the elimination of the wage system.” Likewise, while the initial phase of socialism/communism would require the formation of a new political command structure in the revolutionary period, the goal in the higher phase was the withering away of the state as a separate appara- tus standing above and in antagonistic relation to society, to be replaced ‘with a form of political organization that Frederick Engels referred to as “community,” associated with a communally based form of production.”

In the later, higher phase of the transition of socialism/communism, not only would property be collectively owned and controlled, but the consti- tutive cells of society would be reconstituted on a communal basis and production would be in the hands of the associated producers. In these conditions, Marx stated, “labor” will have become not a mere “means of life” but “itself...the prime necessity of life.’\*® Production would be di- rected at use values rather than exchange values, in line with a society in which “the free development of each” would be “the condition for the free development of all.” The abolition of capitalist class society and the creation of a society of associated producers would lead to the end of class exploitation, along with the elimination of the divisions between men- tal and manual labor and between town and country. The monogamous, patriarchal family based on the domestic enslavement of women would also be surmounted. Fundamental to Marx’s picture of the higher phase of the society of associated producers was a new social metabolism of hu- manity and the earth. In his most general statement on the material con- ditions governing the new society, he wrote: “Freedom, in this sphere [the realm of natural necessity], can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism of nature in a rational way...accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy” in the process of promoting conditions of sustainable human development.

‘Writing in The State and Revolution and elsewhere, Lenin deftly captured Marx’s arguments on the lower and higher phases, depicting these as the first and second phases of communism. Lenin went on to emphasize what he called “the scientific distinction between socialism and commu- nism,” whereby “what is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the ‘first,’ or lower phase of communist society,” whereas the term com- ‘munism, meaning “complete communism,” was most appropriately used for the higher phase. Although Lenin closely aligned this distinction with Marx’s analysis, in later official Marxism this came to be rigidified in terms of two entirely separate stages, with the so-called communist stage so removed from the stage of socialism that it became utopianized, no longer seen as part of a continuous or ongoing struggle. Based on a ‘wooden conception of the socialist stage and the intermediary principle of distribution to each according to one’s labor, Joseph Stalin carried out an ideological war against the ideal of real equality, which he character- ized as a “reactionary, petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics but not of a socialist society organized on Marxist lines.” ‘This same stance was to persist in the Soviet Union in one way or another all the way to Mikhail Gorbachev.\*

Hence, as explained by Michael Lebowitz in The Socialist Imperative, “rather than a continuous struggle to go beyond what Marx called the ‘defects’ inherited from capitalist society, the standard interpretation” of Marxism in the half-century from the late 1930s to the late ’80s “intro- duced a division of post-capitalist society into two distinct ‘stages,” de- termined economistically by the level of development of the productive forces. Fundamental changes in social relations emphasized by Marx as the very essence of the socialist path were abandoned in the process of living with and adapting to the defects carried over from capitalist soci- ety. Instead, Marx had insisted on a project aimed at building the com- munity of associated producers “from the outset” as part of an ongoing, if necessarily uneven, process of socialist construction.”\*

‘This abandonment of the socialist ideal associated with Marx’s higher phase of communism was wrapped up in a complex way with changing ‘material (and class) conditions and eventually the demise of Soviet-type societies, which tended to stagnate once they ceased to be revolutionary and even resurrected class forms, heralding their eventual collapse as the new class or nomenklatura abandoned the system. As Sweezy argued in 1971, “state ownership and planning are not enough to define a viable social- ism, one immune to the threat of retrogression and capable of moving forward on the second leg of the movement to communism.” Something more was needed: the continuous struggle to create a society of equals.

For Marx, the movement toward a society of associated producers was the very essence of the socialist path embedded in “communist con- sciousness.”” Yet, once socialism came to be defined in more restrictive, economistic terms, particularly in the Soviet Union from the late 1930s onward, in which substantial inequality was defended, post-revolution- ary society lost the vital connection to the dual struggle for freedom and necessity, and hence became disconnected from the long-term goals of socialism from which it had formerly derived its meaning and coherence.

Based on this experience, it is evident that the only way to build so- cialism in the twenty-first century is to embrace precisely those aspects of the socialist/communist ideal that allow a theory and practice radical enough to address the urgent needs of the present, while also not los-ing sight of the needs of the future. If the planetary ecological crisis has taught us anything, it is that what is required is a new social metabo- lism with the earth, a society of ecological sustainability and substantive equality. This can be seen in the extraordinary achievements of Cuban ecology, as recently shown by Mauricio Betancourt in “The Effect of Cu- ban Agroecology in Mitigating the Metabolic Rift” in Global Environmental Change. This conforms to what Georg Lukacs called the necessary “dou- ble transformation” of human social relations and the human relations to nature Such an emancipatory project must necessarily pass through various revolutionary phases, which cannot be predicted in advance. Yet, to be successful, a revolution must seek to make itself irreversible through the promotion of an organic system directed at genuine human needs, rooted in substantive equality and the rational regulation of the human social metabolism with nature.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a new Marxist international.

Foster 2020, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy, 9-2020, “The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal.” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 72 (4): 1–13. doi:10.14452/MR-072-04-2020-08\_1.)

The International of Workers and Peoples

Although untold numbers of people are engaged in innumerable strug- gles against the capitalist juggernaut in their specific localities all around the world, struggles for substantive equality, including battles over race, gender, and class, depend on the fight against imperialism at the global level. Hence, there is a need for a new global organization of workers based on the model of Marx's First International.“ Such an International for the twenty-first century cannot simply consist of a group of elite in- tellectuals from the North engaged in World Social Forum-like discussion activities or in the promotion of social-democratic regulatory reforms as in the so-called Socialist and Progressive Internationals. Rather, it needs to be constituted as a workers-based and peoples-based organization, rooted from the beginning in a strong South-South alliance so as to place the struggle against imperialism at the center of the socialist revolt against capitalism, as contemplated by figures such as Chavez and Amin.

In 2011, just prior to his final illness, Chavez was preparing, following his next election, to launch what was to be called the New International (pointedly not a Fifth International) focusing on a South-South alliance and giving a global significance to socialism in the twenty-first centu- ry. This would have extended the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America to a global level.” This, however, never saw the light of day due to Chaver’s rapid decline and untimely death.

‘Meanwhile, a separate conception grew out of the efforts of Amin, working with the World Forum for Alternatives. Amin had long contem- plated a Fifth International, an idea he was still presenting as late as May 2018. But in July 2018, only a month before his death, this had been trans- formed into what he called an Internationale of Workers and Peoples, explicitly recognizing that a pure worker-based International that did not take into account the situation of peoples was inadequate in confronting imperialism.” This, he stated, would be an organization, not just a move- ment. It would be aimed at the

alliance of all working peoples of the world and not only those qualified as representatives of the proletariat...including all wage earners of the ser- ‘vices, peasants, farmers, and the peoples oppressed by modern capitalism. ‘The construction must also be based on the recognition and respect of di- ‘versity, whether of parties, trade unions, or other popular organizations of struggle, guaranteeing their real independence.... In the absence of [such revolutionary] progress the world would continue to be ruled by chaos, barbarian practices, and the destruction of the earth.\*

‘The creation of a New International cannot of course occur in a vacuum. but needs to be articulated within and as a product of the building of uni- fied mass organizations expanding at the grassroots level in conjunction with revolutionary movements and delinkings from the capitalist system. all over the world. It could not occur, in Amin’s view, without new ini- tiatives from the Global South to create broad alliances, as in the initial organized struggles associated with the Third World movement launched at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the struggle for a New Interna- tional Economic Order. These three elements — grassroots movements, delinking, and cross-country/cross-continent alliances—are all crucial in his conception of the anti-imperialist struggle. Today this needs to be united with the global ecological movement.

Such a universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism, Amin insisted, must be characterized by audacity and more audacity, breaking with the coordinates of the system at every point, and finding its ideal path in the principle of from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need, as the very definition of human community. Today we live in a time of the perfect coincidence of the struggles for freedom and ne- cessity, leading to a renewed struggle for freedom as necessity. The choice before us is unavoidable: ruin or revolution.

#### That requires rejecting the aff and critically interrogating the colonial discourse of the 1AC---plan focus distracts from crucial conservations about epistemic violence, accepting colonial erasure as a tragic but inevitable byproduct of policymaking.

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Many humanist efforts are specifically humanitarian in nature, in which individual students seek to ‘give back’ in recognition of their relative advantage in existing systems. In the context of internationalization, this framing may be preferable to market-driven approaches, yet its construction of relationality maintains the student in a position of benevolence and enlightenment vis-à-vis those they are understood to be ‘helping’ (Jefferess, 2008). In this ethical formation, students from the Global North are generally situated as those with superior knowledge, values, and experiences that they generously grant to the ‘less fortunate.’ Within this paternalistic dynamic, the student is rarely prompted to question the underlying systems or causes of inequality or to consider how they benefit from and perpetuate these systems. Rather, the Other becomes a vehicle for affirming their exceptionalism and moral ‘goodness’ – potentially as a means to justify their own privilege. Gaztambide-Fernández and Howard (2013) point out that this investment in “Being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize particular discourses” (p. 2). This framing then forecloses the opportunity for students to examine their own complicity, and may be understood as an example of what Tuck and Yang (2012), drawing on Malwhinney, describe as “moves to innocence,” through which an individual seeks to assuage their guilt, deny responsibility, preserve a positive self-image, and maintain their existing investments in harmful desired futures.

Thus, despite their important differences, both market-driven and humanist approaches to internationalization are often premised on developmental notions of humanity, and are shaped by a “convenient amnesia” of colonial histories and current structures of harm (Thobani as cited by Stone-Mediatore, 2011, p. 49). Questions that therefore arise include: Why does encountering difference in the context of internationalization often reproduce rather than disrupt assumptions about the supremacy of Western knowledge and society? How might humanitarian efforts abroad function as a means to avoid addressing local injustices? How do developmental logics limit the possibility of engaging in relationships premised on solidarity and self-implication rather than instrumentalization for affirmation of a benevolent self? What might prompt students to see their own material comforts as part of the cause of inequity? What might interrupt our satisfactions with existing formulations of self/subject and other/object, and is it possible to imagine an approach to ethics that begins and ends with neither?

Conclusion: Im/possible Ethical Demands

There is a danger that our critical approaches to the ethics of internationalization may be circularly repeating the very violence that we seek to disrupt. In order to make visible the ways that colonial categories and capitalist imperatives are reproduced, scholars of higher education need to historicize the deep entanglements of our institutions and our subjectivities with empire, trace the origins of our dearest concepts, face our own investments in the false promises of universal humanity and linear progress, and consider how all of these frame and thereby limit available ethical and educational possibilities. As Unterhalter and Carpentier (2010) note, “Global higher education seems uniquely well placed to serve the interests of redressing inequality, enhancing participatory debate and deliberation. But to do this requires higher education institutions recognizing problems of their past and present in order to contribute to ideas of justice for our future” (p. 29). Decolonial analysis, as I have offered in this paper, is just one means of doing this work.

However, analysis itself is insufficient. Having identified the depth of the problems we face, it is common to promptly begin the search for concepts and plans of action that can renew our hope and that we believe will lead to something better. This desire for guaranteed alternatives may be in part related to the fact that conversations about internationalization tend to be, as Waters (2012) suggests, “dominated and driven by educational practitioners – education institutions, state level policy makers and public bodies, as well as private, commercial enterprises – with a vested interest in the ultimate success of internationalising initiatives” (p. 127). The imperative toward immediate improvement and assured success is also a deeply embedded dimension of Western thought, which constantly seeks to reduce complexity and eliminate uncertainty in order to smoothly engineer the future. And there is good reason for seeking solutions; harmful practices and policies do not stop producing harm when we name them. Every critique therefore begs the follow-up questions: “So what? Now what?” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 227).

These questions are important, and answering them is one essential element of our responsibility as researchers and educators to contribute to the reduction of ongoing harm. There is a strong need to produce practical, accessible, and impactful resources for use in higher education classrooms, policy reforms, training for administrators, and social justice programming for students and staff. At the same time, these solutions often create their own unforeseen problems. Furthermore, desires for coherence, consensus, and guaranteed futures have all contributed to the reproduction of significant harms as certain experiences, individuals, and even entire communities are sacrificed or silenced in order to achieve these goals. Although we cannot live and act in a space of uncertainty and ambivalence at all times, the immediate search for practical action and answers can also foreclose difficult but necessary conversations and questions that have no easy resolution. We also need to learn to sit in this space of uncertainty and discomfort to consider questions with either no answer, or too many answers to count; to lay out on the table the contradictory elements of all possible answers to our ‘so what, now what’ questions; and to ask self-implicated questions about our own deep investments in a harmful system.

### 1NC---T

Next off is topicality

#### “On” indicates the object of an action

Brown 18 (BROWN, Judge. Opinion in State ex rel. Montgomery v. Brain, 422 P. 3d 1065 - Ariz: Court of Appeals, 1st Div. 2018. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 8/26/21)

¶ 13 The State asserts that if "on another person" were to modify the first clause of A.R.S. § 13-105(13), then no crime could be charged as a dangerous offense absent "direct contact with another person." But the State construes the word "on" too narrowly, as it can function to identify a variety of situations. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 823-24 (1988) (giving the following definitions of "on": (1) "used... to indicate position in close proximity with ... "; (2) "used ... to indicate the object of collision, opposition, or hostile action ... "; and (3) "used ... to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort "). These varied definitions also defeat the State's arguments that "[o]ne does not discharge nor threateningly exhibit a dangerous instrument `on' a person" and that "a dangerous instrument would be discharged at another person or threateningly exhibited to another person." Given the broad meaning of "on," there is no grammatical inconsistency in the language the legislature used to define a dangerous offense.

#### ‘Anticompetitive’ means reducing competition, in contrast to procompetitive

Texas Supreme Court 15 (Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. IN RE MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSP. SYSTEM, 464 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. 2015). Google Scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/22/21).

Neither section 160.007 nor any other peer review committee privilege that incorporates the phrase "anticompetitive action" defines the term.[43] Black's Law Dictionary defines "anticompetitive" as "[h]aving a tendency to reduce or eliminate competition" in contrast to the term procompetitive.[44] Procompetitive is in turn defined as "[i]ncreasing, encouraging, or preserving competition."[45] Competition itself is defined as "[t]he struggle for commercial advantage; the effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties."[46] The dictionary also notes that the term anticompetitive "describes the type of conduct or circumstances generally targeted by antitrust laws,"[47] although the statement is "not purely definitional."[48]

#### The plan violates—it is a prohibition *on* business practices NOT on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Extra T is a voter

#### A---jurisdiction---extra-topicality is beyond the judge’s scope, and proves the resolution insufficient

#### B---solvency boosters---extra-T steals a core neg argument: that increased competition can’t solve the problems of industry. Debate’s a game of inches, and letting the aff fiat the end to an industry stacks the deck for the aff.

#### In the second half, “Expand” requires an increase or extension of the same use for core antitrust laws

Turpen and Agosta 86 (MICHAEL C. TURPEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA. SUSAN B. AGOSTA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL CHIEF, LEGAL SERVICES. “Opinion No. 85-122” Court:Attorney General of Oklahoma — Opinion, Date published: Feb 27, 1986, <https://casetext.com/case/opinion-no-16187> , date accessed 7/12/21)

"Expand" is defined as "to increase the range, scope, volume, size, etc., of. . . ." New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language (Funk Wagnall, 1982 ed., p. 446). A review of court cases from other jurisdiction offers additional guidance on the meaning of "expand." "Expand" means "an extension of a use or an increase in intensity of the same use." People v. Triem Steel Processing, 125 N.E.2d 678, 679 (Ill.App. 1955). The Illinois Supreme Court has said "expand means to extend, to enlarge." Federal Electric Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1947).

#### The “core” antitrust laws are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Act—from the topic paper

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### The plan violates—antitrust laws were created as an alternative to socialism AND the plan sweeps antitrust laws out of existence

Dewey 64 (Donald Dewey-Associate Professor of Economics, Columbia University. “THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTITRUST: SCIENCE OR RELIGION?” , Virginia Law Review , Apr., 1964, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Apr., 1964), pp. 413-434, accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 10/3/21)

Nevertheless, even if we were able to explain the causes and timing of the corporate revolution, we would still be left with an important and unanswered question. Why did the reaction against laissez faire in the United States produce antitrust while in most European countries it produced strong socialist movements? I think it no accident that following World War II the decline of the socialist tradition in the richer countries of western Europe has been accompanied by a rise of interest in antitrust. If "the commanding heights of industry" are soon to be nationalized and operated as state-owned monopolies, there is no point in worrying about the minor defects of a legal framework that is shortly to be swept away. But if nationalization and state monopoly is not the answer, then the revision of the existing legal framework can be a matter of importance. The reader will be spared another explanation of "why there is no socialism in America." For our purposes, the important aspect of the corporate revolution is the manner in which observers, especially judges, theorized about it after it was largely over. The principal fruit of their reflection was the distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" growth in the corpora- tion. Corporate growth was natural provided that it was not the result of wholesale mergers nor gained by the use of business practices that were unfair. Such tactics could be either ma/a in se (commercial bribery) or objectionable because they were the instrument of a sort of economic terror that discouraged competent rivals from offering competition.

#### Vote neg:

#### Ground---socialism steals counterplans that eliminate the industry and remove disads based in antitrust like tradeoff.

#### Limits---they lead to a flood of new socialism affs which stretches the neg too thin

#### Topic education---fiating radical politics beyond the bounds of the resolution is lazy academic planning---they should be forced to find justifications for progressive politics within the confines of antitrust

## CASE

### Imperialism ADV---1NC

#### Can’t solve imperialism---military still exists

#### The American public loves the bomb—supports the use of nukes in warfighting—democratization increases risk of use

Sagan and Valentino 2017 – Scott D Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and Benjamin Valentino is an Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” *International Security* Volume 42, No. 1) bhb

The novel survey experiments described in this article, by re-creating the trade-off between an atomic attack and the risk to the lives of U.S. soldiers that the United States faced at the end of World War II, produced many surprising findings. The U.S. public's willingness to use nuclear weapons and deliberately kill foreign civilians has not changed as much since 1945 as many scholars have assumed. Contrary to the nuclear taboo thesis, a majority of Americans are willing to support the use of a nuclear weapon against an Iranian city killing 100,000 civilians. Contrary to the theory that Americans accept the noncombatant immunity norm, an even larger percentage of the U.S. public was willing to kill 100,000 Iranian civilians with conventional weapons. Women are as hawkish as men and, in some scenarios, are even more willing to support the use of nuclear weapons. Belief in the value of retribution is strongly related to support for using nuclear weapons, and a large majority of those who favor the use of nuclear weapons against Iran stated that the Iranian people bore some of the responsibility for that attack because they had not overthrown their government.

Future research will be necessary to determine whether these findings hold only for Americans or whether they are generalizable to the citizens of other countries. The U.S. public may be an outlier with regard to supporting nuclear weapons use, as it is an international outlier with respect to support for the death penalty. A 2016 public opinion poll in the United Kingdom, for example, found that approval ratings for President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan are much lower than those in the United States (28 percent in the United Kingdom compared with 45 percent in the United States).88 It would be especially useful to focus on public attitudes about nuclear weapons use among key U.S. friends and allies. It would be valuable to know, for example, how the Israeli, the British, or the French public views potential uses of nuclear weapons in scenarios, such as those analyzed above, in which they are contemplating trade-offs between saving their own soldiers versus killing foreign noncombatants. Future survey experiments could provide new information not only about allied publics’ views regarding potential uses of their own nuclear arsenals, but also about whether these publics would support or oppose the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in specific scenarios, which could be an important consideration for U.S. leaders contemplating nuclear use.

Further research will also be needed to determine whether the U.S. public maintains these priorities under other wartime or crisis scenarios. It is possible that the widespread hostility that the American public harbors toward Iran helped produce these findings, and in a war against other foreign powers against which there is less hostility, there would be less willingness to use nuclear weapons or kill noncombatants. Still, it seems likely that the U.S. public would be hostile toward the population of any foreign state that is at war with the United States. Yet it is also possible that the U.S. public would feel differently about killing foreign civilians in a war that the United States initiated instead of one sparked by an enemy surprise attack. It would also be valuable to know how strongly U.S. public attraction to nuclear use in our experiments was influenced by the fact that the United States’ adversary in the war was an Islamic state in the Middle East. One could explore these effects through new experiments that vary the religious and racial identity of potential victims of a U.S. nuclear attack.89

We have been careful in these experiments not to “prime” the respondents in ways that might bias the results. For example, in our stories, we did not mention the possible environmental effects of nuclear weapons. We described the victims as “civilians” rather than “innocent women and children.” We mentioned only “immediate deaths and long-term fatalities” from the nuclear attack, and did not describe the gruesome details of fatal burns or radiation sickness. We did not raise the possibility that an attack targeted against a city as a “shock strategy” would violate both the laws of armed conflict and U.S. nuclear weapons employment guidance, and thus would also likely be opposed by many senior U.S. military leaders.90 Nor did we expose subjects to cues from political elites who opposed the bombing.91 All these factors could influence public support for or opposition to the use of nuclear weapons or violations of the noncombatant immunity norm in the real world and should be studied in the future.

In the final analysis, our survey experiments cannot tell us how future U.S. presidents and their top advisers would weigh their options if they found themselves in a conflict in which they faced a trade-off between risking large-scale U.S. military fatalities and killing large numbers of foreign noncombatants. Nevertheless, these surveys do tell us something unsettling about the instincts of the U.S. public concerning nuclear weapons and noncombatant immunity. When provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the first use of nuclear weapons a taboo, and their commitment to noncombatant immunity in wartime is shallow. Instead, a majority of Americans prioritize winning the war quickly and saving the lives of U.S. soldiers, even if that means killing large numbers of foreign noncombatants.

Both just war doctrine and the laws of armed conflict require leaders and soldiers to make active efforts and accept risks in war to avoid the deaths of foreign civilians. Michael Walzer's “doctrine of double intention,” for example, requires that soldiers not just intend to attack only legitimate military targets, but that they also take active measures to minimize unintended collateral damage, including accepting at least some risk to themselves.92 With respect to international law, Article 57 of the Geneva Protocol I demands that all signatories “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life.”93 Although the “principle of feasible precaution” may require military professionals to take some personal risk to protect noncombatants or require political leaders to take some risk of the loss of soldiers to protect foreign noncombatants, there is no agreement on the proper risk ratio. How many soldiers’ lives on one's own side is it appropriate to risk to reduce the risk of the unintended killing of foreign noncombatants?94

We were not surprised by the finding that most Americans place a higher value on the life of an American soldier than the life of a foreign noncombatant. What was surprising, however, was the radical extent of that preference. Our experiments suggest that the majority of Americans find a 1:100 risk ratio to be morally acceptable. They were willing to kill 2 million Iranian civilians to save 20,000 U.S. soldiers. One respondent who approved of the conventional air strike that killed 100,000 Iranian civilians candidly expressed even more extreme preferences regarding proportionality and risk ratios, while displacing U.S. responsibility for the attack onto the Iranian people: “I would sacrifice 1 million enemies versus 1 of our military. Their choice, their death.”

U.S. political leaders have, in some important cases in the past, been aware of public sentiments regarding retribution and revenge and have used the threat of public pressure in favor of nuclear attacks to add credibility to thinly veiled nuclear threats. President George H.W. Bush, for example, wrote to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in January 1991 that “the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons…. The American people would demand the strongest possible response.”95 Secretary of State James Baker amplified the message in a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz: “If the conflict starts, God forbid, and chemical or biological weapons are used against our forces, the American people would demand vengeance. We have the means to exact it.”96 Although scholars now know that the Bush administration had already decided not to use nuclear weapons to respond to any Iraqi chemical or biological weapons attack, Saddam Hussein did not know that and took the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons use seriously.97 Our survey experiments demonstrate that such public pressures to use nuclear weapons are not fanciful and should be taken seriously by both U.S. leaders and any foreign government contemplating war against the United States. Indeed, these experiments suggest that pressures for escalating violence, including a public demand for vengeance and pressure to use nuclear weapons, extend beyond scenarios in which the United States is responding to nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.

Past surveys that show a very substantial decline in U.S. public support for the 1945 dropping of the atomic bombs are a misleading guide to how the public would react if placed in similar wartime circumstances in the future. It is fortunate that the United States has not faced wartime conditions in the nuclear era in which U.S. political leaders and the public had to contemplate such grave trade-offs.98 Today, as in 1945, the U.S. public is unlikely to serve as a serious constraint on any president who might consider using nuclear weapons in the crucible of war.

### Tech ADV---1NC

#### American innovation linearly increases colonial violence.

Hickel 21, London School of Economics and Political Science, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK (Jason, The Anti-Colonial Politics of Degrowth, *Political Geography*, Volume 88, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102404)

Let me begin by noting a few facts. High-income countries are the primary drivers of global ecological breakdown. The global North is responsible for 92 percent of emissions in excess of the planetary boundary (Hickel, 2020a), while the consequences of climate breakdown fall disproportionately upon the global South. The South already suffers the vast majority of the damage inflicted by climate breakdown, and if temperatures exceed 1.5 degrees centigrade, much of the tropics could experience heat events that exceed the limits of human survival (Zhang, Held, & Fueglistaler, 2021). Likewise, high-income countries are responsible for the majority of excess global resource use, with an average material footprint of 28 tons per capita per year – four times over the sustainable level (Bringezu, 2015). Crucially, these high levels of consumption depend on a significant net appropriation from the global South through unequal exchange, including 10.1 billion tons of embodied raw materials and 379 billion hours of embodied labor per year (Dorninger et al., 2021).

In other words, economic growth in the North relies on patterns of colonization: the appropriation of atmospheric commons, and the appropriation of Southern resources and labour. In terms of both emissions and resource use, the global ecological crisis is playing out along colonial lines. This is often framed as a problem of “ecological debt”, but this language – while useful – hardly captures the violence at stake.

Just as Northern growth is colonial in character, so too “green growth” visions tend to presuppose the perpetuation of colonial arrangements. Transitioning to 100 percent renewable energy should be done as rapidly as possible, but scaling solar panels, wind turbines and batteries requires enormous material extraction, and this will come overwhelmingly from the global South. Continued growth in the North means rising final energy demand, which will in turn require rising levels of extractivism. Complicating matters further, decarbonization cannot be accomplished fast enough to respect Paris targets as long as energy use in the global North remains so high (Hickel & Kallis, 2020). To compensate for this problem, IPCC models rely heavily on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) to get us out of trouble. But deploying BECCS at scale would require land for biofuel plantations up to three times the size of India, which would almost certainly be appropriated from the South. This is not an acceptable future, and is incompatible with socialist values (Hickel, 2020b).

Degrowth calls for rich nations to scale down throughput to sustainable levels, reducing aggregate energy use to enable a sufficiently rapid transition to renewables, and reducing aggregate resource use to reverse ecological breakdown. This demand is not just about ecology; rather, it is rooted in anti-colonial principles. Degrowth scholars and activists explicitly recognize the reality of ecological debt and call for an end to the colonial patterns of appropriation that underpin Northern growth, in order to release the South from the grip of extractivism and a future of catastrophic climate breakdown. Degrowth is, in other words, a demand for decolonization. Southern countries should be free to organize their resources and labor around meeting human needs rather than around servicing Northern growth.

Decolonization along these lines is a crucial precondition for successful development in the South. Dependency theorists have pointed out that “catch-up” development is impossible within a system predicated on appropriation and polarized accumulation. This is true also from an ecological perspective. The alternative is to pursue a strategy of convergence: throughput should decline in the North to get back within sustainable levels while increasing in the South to meet human needs, converging at a level consistent with ecological stability and universal human welfare.

This much is straightforward. But there are further implications of degrowth that are worth drawing out here. For degrowth, the problem is not ultimately the behavior of individual “consumers” (as in mainstream environmentalist thought) but rather the structure and logic of the underlying economic system, namely, capitalism. We know that capitalism is predicated on surplus extraction and accumulation; it must take more from labor and nature than it gives back. As Marxist ecologists have pointed out, such a system necessarily generates inequalities and ecological breakdown. But many economic systems have been extractive in the past; what makes capitalism distinctive, and uniquely problematic, is that it is organized around, and dependent on, perpetual growth. In other words, capital seeks not only surplus, but an exponentially rising surplus.

To understand why this is a problem, we have to grasp what “growth” means. People commonly assume that GDP growth is an increase in value (or provisioning, or well-being), when, in fact, it is primarily an increase in commodity production, represented in terms of price. This distinction between value and price is important. In order to realize surplus value, capital seeks to enclose and commodify free commons in order extract payment for access, or, in the realm of production, to depress the prices of inputs to below the value that is actually derived from them. Both tendencies require appropriation from colonial or neo-colonial “frontiers”, where labor and nature can be taken for free, or close to free, and where costs can be “externalized”. In this sense, capitalist growth is intrinsically colonial in character, and has been for 500 years. Enclosure, colonization, mass enslavement, extractivism, sweatshops, ecological breakdown – all of this has been propelled by the growth imperative and its demand for cheap labor and nature.

Of course, there is nothing “naturally” cheap about labor and nature at the frontier. On the contrary, they have to be actively cheapened. To do this, European capitalists advanced a dualist ontology that cast humans as subjects with mind and agency, and nature as an object to be exploited and controlled for human ends. Into the category of “nature” they shunted not only all nonhuman beings, but also Black and Indigenous people,

and most women, all of whom were cast as not-quite-fully-human, in order to legitimize dispossession, enslavement and exploitation (Federici, 2004; Patel & Moore, 2017). Racist discourses were leveraged to cheapen the lives of others for the sake of growth. Similar discourses are used today to justify wages in the South that remain below the level of subsistence (Hickel, 2020d).

# 2nc – ableism+t

## T

### 1NR---AT: Everything Business Do Is Anticompetitive

#### Any meaningful antitrust discussions requires distinguishing between the two

FTC 6 (Consumer Benefits and Harms: How Best to Distinguish Aggressive, Pro-Consumer Competition From Business Conduct To Attain or Maintain a Monopoly, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/04/07/06-3366/consumer-benefits-and-harms-how-best-to-distinguish-aggressive-pro-consumer-competition-from)

An appropriate antitrust approach, therefore, requires means for distinguishing permissible from impermissible conduct in varied circumstances. Moreover, those means should provide reasonable guidance to businesses attempting to evaluate the legality of proposed conduct before undertaking it. The development of clear standards that work to the advantage of consumers while enabling businesses to comply with the antitrust laws presents some of the most complex issues facing the FTC, the DOJ, the courts, and the antitrust bar. Commentators actively debate the character of conduct that implicates section 2, and the utility of different tests for distinguishing anticompetitive and procompetitive business practices.

#### Anticompetitive practices are rigorously defined and confined to a particular set of actions

Sorinas et al 18 (SERGIO SORINAS-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. JEAN MEIJER-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. BERTRAND MONTEMBAULT-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. “THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S NEW PRICING FREEDOM AND COMPETITION ACT” , *Herbert Smith Freehills* , <https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/hsfpdf/latest-thinking/the-democratic-republic-of-congo%E2%80%99s-new-pricing-freedom-and-competition-act?pdf=1#:~:text=ANTI%2DCOMPETITIVE%20PRACTICES,competitors%3B%20(b)%20enable%20businesses> , 28 August 2018, date accessed 8/27/21)

In the Competition Act, anti-competitive practices are defined as:13

* Cartels (whether through a formal agreement or concerted practice): the Act prohibits all cartels which may (a) restrict access to the market by competitors; (b) enable businesses to carve up markets amongst them or fix prices; (c) hamper production, outlets, investments or technical and technological advances; or (d) skew the outcome of a competitive bid.14 However, authorisations may be granted by the competition commission in respect of cartels which contribute to promoting economic progress, job creation and maintenance;15
* Abuse of a dominant position: under Article 32, it is prohibited for a dominant firm 16 to (a) refuse to supply goods or services; (b) sell goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods unrelated to the object of the contract; (c) impose discriminatory prices and conditions of sales; and (d) abusively terminate business relations;17
* Abuse of economic dependence is prohibited. Yet, while defining economic dependence18, the Act does not specify what behaviour amounts to an abuse in such case.

**1NR---Def---On**

**Anticompetitive business practices must be ‘subjected to’ prohibitions**

**Whitbeck 11** – Justice, Court of Appeals of Michigan (People v. Johnson, 293 Mich. App. 79)

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is "'to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent."' People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), quoting People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). "'We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.'" Williams, 475 Mich at 250, quoting Morey, 461 Mich at 330. If a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is appropriate. People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50; 753 NW2d 78 (2008).

MCL 777.56(1) provides, in relevant part:

Prior record variable 6 is relationship to the criminal justice system. Score prior record variable 6 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:

\* \* \*

(d) The offender is on probation or delayed sentence status or on bond awaiting adjudication or sentencing for a misdemeanor .... 5 points

"On" is defined as "so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from" and "**subject to**." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). "Bond" is defined as "[a]n obligation; a promise." Black's Law Dictionary [94] (9th ed). Therefore, the phrase "on bond" in MCL 777.56(1)(d) can be interpreted to mean "subject to an obligation."

**Anticompetitive business practices is the object affected**

**Rosenthal 8** - United States District Judge (Lee, Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811)

Emtel and the movants agree that,

\*\*\*note 11

In the context of 35 U.S.C.S. § 287(c) of the Patent Act, the word "on" is used to indicate the **object** affected by actual, perceptible action or used to indicate the object of an action directed, tending, or moving against it.

in this context, the word "on" is "[u]sed to [824] indicate the object affected by actual, perceptible action" or "[u]sed to indicate the object of an action directed, tending, or moving against it." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 953 (3d ed. 1997). A subject may act in a way that "affects" an object or "direct" an action toward an object without physically touching it. The legislative history makes clear that the statute immunizes physicians from patent suits for performing medical procedures in treating a patient, while allowing the enforceable patent protection for medical devices, drugs, or biotechnologies. Reading the preposition "on" as requiring direct physical contact would exclude a number of medical procedures from the immunity provision. This reading would undermine the statute's purpose. "On the body" requires that the medical or surgical "activity" be directed at or affect the patient's body. Diagnosing a medical condition, providing instructions to a different medical caregiver in a different location about treating that caregiver's patient, and aiding another caregiver in treating a patient's medical condition, are "activities" that are directed at or affect a patient's body. Emtel's first argument to avoid the application of section 287(c) fails.

# 1nr – empire

### AT: Utilitarianism---2NC

#### Utilitarianism is a new link---under Empire it necessitates the sacrifice of the Global South---only actively prioritizing discardable populations can break this cycle of devastation.

Santos 3, Leading Portuguese social theorist, director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, has written and published widely on the issue of globalization (Boaventura de Sousa, March 26th, “Collective suicide or globalization from below?” *Eurozine*, <https://www.eurozine.com/collective-suicide-or-globalization-from-below/>, Accessed 10-18-2021)

According to the German philosopher Franz Hinkelammert, living in Costa Rica, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to fulfill radically all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it.

Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists.

This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers.

At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of “discardable populations”, referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of “collateral damage”, to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war against Iraq and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, – and much more if the costs of reconstruction are added – enough to pay the health costs of the world’s poorest countries for four years.

Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today’s version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.